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ABSTRACT
The paper provides results of research concerning identification of strate-
gic groups in the Polish banking sector and tests of the usefulness of these
groups in the assessment of financial stability. The theory of strategic
groups predicts the existence of stable groups of companies, stemming from
the strategy adopted by them. The theory also predicts that groups differ
in performance. Our empirical research, preceded by a review of relevant
literature, has been carried out on the basis of a cluster analysis with the
use of Ward’s algorithm that optimises allocation of banks into groups. We
have identified strategic groups in the Polish banking sector, sustained over
time after the year 2000. We have also observed statistically significant dif-
ferences in performance between banks belonging to different groups, and
we have demonstrated further that modelling of profitability within groups
with the use of regression yields more precise estimates of parameters than
in the case of estimation of a model for the whole sector. Thus, breaking
down the whole banking sector into strategic groups creates a possibility to
forecast the banking sector earnings in a more precise way, i.e. to provide
a more precise ex ante assessment of stability of the financial system.
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1 Introduction
Financial stability is indicated more and more often, apart from price sta-
bility, as one of the main objectives of the central bank. Within this task,
a central bank usually conducts ex post assessment of the condition of the
banking sector, the major element of the financial system. However, in order
to fully achieve the stability objective, a central bank should also forecast
the condition of the banking sector, i.e. conduct ex ante assessment of the
stability of financial system. This task may be carried out by predicting the
financial result of the banking sector and — on this basis — assessing banks’
loss absorption abilities. A formal tool of such an analysis in the National
Bank of Poland is the so called analytical scheme of the banking sector, which
is presently developed. It is intended to serve for, inter alia, forecasting the
performance of the banking sector. Ultimately, forecasts and simulations of
basic economic values from macro-models, already functioning in the NBP,
will also be used in the analytical scheme. The analytical scheme will take
into account the fact that particular banks may react to changes of external
factors in a different way. Different reactions of banks may stem from various
reasons: activity profile, asset size, the market segments being major areas
of bank’s operations, the level of relations with foreign entities, etc. Within
the analytical scheme, equations for groups of banks reacting in a similar
way will be estimated. Such an approach, contrary to estimating a single
equation for the whole banking sector, will make it possible to avoid biasing
of the estimators that stems from excessive aggregation and to make fore-
casts more precise. Besides, it will be possible to take into account different
reactions of banks to external factors.
The paper reports the results of research conducted with the purpose of
identifying homogeneous groups of banks in the Polish banking sector, which
might be used in the development of the analytical scheme. In relevant lit-
erature, a breakdown of entities into groups is usually made in the context
of the theory of strategic groups, which has its roots in the theory of man-
agement. The theory of strategic groups predicts forming groups of similar
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entities, based on convergent activities of some companies operating on a
given market. According to the theory, the number of strategies that may be
adopted is limited. The choice of a given strategy by a company results in
its membership in a certain group. Strategic groups are also relatively stable
over time, which stems from mobility barriers.
In the empirical research concerning the banking sector conducted so far,
it has been assumed that the bank’s strategy is reflected in the structure
of its balance sheet. The share of particular balance sheet items in total
assets or the share of particular loan categories in the total loan portfolio
are called strategic variables or strategic dimensions. In this analysis, most
of the strategic variables are related to the balance sheet structure; however,
other variables reflecting the adopted strategy in the profit and loss account
have been used as well.
As it stems from Hackethal’s research (Hackethal, 2001) for the European
commercial banks and from Koller’s research (Koller, 2001) for the largest
Austrian banks, profitability of banks belonging to particular groups shows
statistically significant differences between groups. Should banks’ profitabil-
ity show statistically significant differences between groups, a breakdown of
the banking sector into groups would be useful due to its further use in the
analytical scheme. It would justify the use of the theory of strategic groups
in the analysis the Polish banking sector.
The second half of the 1990s witnessed major changes in the ownership in
the Polish banking sector, which led to numerous mergers and acquisitions.
Ownership changes may disturb the composition of groups, as a change of
the owner may entail a shift in the bank’s strategy. On the other hand, the
share of foreign capital in the Polish banking sector increased substantially
at that time. It might have led to an extended scope of services offered by
banks, which should be manifested through increased similarity of particular
strategic groups1.
1This conclusion requires two assumptions: (1) that the scope of services offered by
banks increases more rapidly than the scope of available services in the banking sector
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This article contains a review of the theory (chapter 2) and the empirical
research (chapter 3) regarding identification of strategic groups. In chapter
4, we describe data used in the research, whereas in chapter 5 we focus on
the methods and tools of identification of groups. Chapter 6 includes results
of the empirical research and a description of the strategic groups identified
in the Polish banking sector in the years 1997-2004. Chapter 7 is a summary
of the research, presenting possible use of the results obtained and outlining
directions for further research.
2 Strategic groups in theory
The theory of strategic groups was introduced by Hunt (1972) and further
developed by Newman (1978). A strategic group is usually defined as a
group of companies operating within the same industry that adopt a similar
strategy as regards products offered and resources used (Porter, 1979).
Thus, within a strategic group, companies make similar decisions in key
areas (Koller, 2001), whereas their similar strategies are characterised by
similar values of certain variables, called strategic variables or strategic di-
mensions. Within a group, strategies of the companies are to a large extent
homogeneous, while they differ substantially among particular groups.
The idea of strategic groups has been popularized by Caves and Porter
(1977), who, apart from barriers to entry, introduced the term of barriers to
mobility. The concept of mobility barriers was supposed to explain the ratio-
nale behind the creation of homogeneous groups of companies. Groups are
formed as a result of discontinuity in available strategies, which are unevenly
distributed over the space spanned by strategic variables. Porter (1980)
states that available strategies prevent a company from taking a stuck-in-
the-middle position between two strategies.
Mobility barriers may be perceived as a wall separating a given group
from its external competition and discouraging a given company from mov-
and (2) that the scope of available services in the banking sector has its limits.
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ing to another group. It is believed that mobility barriers may result from
undertaking similar investments by companies within a group, which increase
their competitiveness and profitability. At the same time, those investments
— for financial reasons — prevent or impede access to a given technology or
patents to third parties. Such investments may include research on a new
technology or invention as well as advertising. In the latter case, the bar-
rier to mobility will comprise a good market position, a recognized brand or
reputation of companies in a group (Ferguson, 2000). In such a case mobil-
ity barriers occur as a result of similar activities undertaken by enterprises.
However, they may also result from offering of similar products. Empiri-
cal research confirms the existence of barriers to mobility (Mascarenhas and
Aaker, 1989); however, the mechanism of their occurrence has not yet been
ultimately identified.
In the case of the banking sector it seems that investments in technology
undertaken by banks should not have any significant meaning. Technology,
such as the level of IT infrastructure, is a basic condition of existence of an
institution in the banking sector. The profitability of a financial institution
depends to a greater extent on its ability to maintain the existing and win
new customers as well as on the quality of risk management. Therefore,
investments that might prove to be significant mobility barriers should to a
larger extent involve expenses related to the development of a branch network
or of risk management models. Expenses related to advertising which, on the
one hand, builds the bank’s brand and, on the other hand, supports sales of
the products offered that also serve as an indication of the strategy adopted
by the bank, may also turn out to be material for the formation of strategic
groups.
Adoption of the assumption that mobility barriers exist leads to three
conclusions (Leask, 2004), which may be recognized as predictions of the
strategic groups theory. Firstly, the theory allows the possibility of existence
of a hierarchy of strategic groups. Groups comprising more effective com-
panies are separated by higher mobility barriers than groups of companies
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with lower profitability. Secondly, changes in the environment have differ-
ent influence on particular groups, based on the differences in the impact of
external factors, related to various levels of protection regarding the mobil-
ity barriers. However, companies within the same group respond in a similar
way to changes in external factors. Thirdly, the theory suggests that the lack
of mobility between groups results to a larger extent from a company’s his-
tory and its assets accumulated rather than from the nature of investments
currently undertaken.
Porter (1979), on the other hand, argues that the existence of strategic
groups reduces the level of competition within an industry. It results from
co-ordination and co-operation between group members, which takes the
competition within particular groups to a level lower than that of competition
between groups. The scope of this dependency is conditioned on three factors:
the number of groups and the distribution of their shares in the market, the
diversity among the groups (the so-called strategic distance) and the level
of diversity in the profiles of buyers of services and products (Heene and
Houthoofd, 2002).
Co-ordination of activities rather than co-operation should be of greater
importance for the formation of groups in the banking sector. Smaller banks
often imitate the behaviour of banks with a stronger market position. It
is particularly visible in the case of changes in interest rates on loans and
deposits. On the other hand, a lasting co-operation between banks, related
to a particular project, is rather difficult to imagine, although exceptions
occur. An example of banks’ co-operation is the initiative that has led to
the creation of a common database of borrowers and their debts. Payment
systems are another example of co-operation among banks.
The development of the strategic groups theory has been based on the
premises of the explanation of differences in results achieved by different
companies operating within the same industry. The existence of mobility
barriers does not explain, however, the differences in profits; it only implies
a possibility that these differences will be sustained over time. In order
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to explain the origin of differences in the profitability of particular groups,
authors of the strategic groups theory (Porter, 1980) used the structure-
conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm. This hypothesis is based on the as-
sumption that the structure of the market, understood through the prism
of the size and number of particular players, determines their position on a
given market and specifies their strategy, thus influencing their profitability.
Thus, initially, the existence of strategic groups was linked to relative sizes of
companies operating on a given market (Caves and Porter, 1978; Caves and
Pugel, 1980). Further research, however, expands the analysis to a larger
number of strategic dimensions, which generally concern the structure of
balance sheets of particular companies (Passmore 1985, Amel and Rhoades,
1988).
Thus, the theory provides for considerable and sustained over time dif-
ferences in the profitability of companies among groups. Movement of a
company to a more effective group is made difficult due to the mobility bar-
riers (Caves and Porter 1977). The theory also predicts similar responses of
group members to changes in the environment.
Different reactions of companies to external factors, provided for in the
theory, may entail certain differences in the mechanism of interest rate trans-
mission in particular groups (Kashyap and Stein, 1995). The use of monetary
policy instruments in ensuring stability must therefore take into account dif-
ferent reactions of banks in different groups, in order for the response of the
system to a change in the monetary policy to be as intended. On the other
hand, assessment of the financial system stability may be performed with
the use of a formalised general equilibrium model (e.g. Goodhart, Sunirand
and Tsomocos, 2004) or an econometric model of performance of the banking
sector, developed presently in the NBP. Since the theory of strategic groups
provides for sustained significant differences in profitability between groups,
as well as for different reactions of companies in particular groups to exter-
nal factors, the breakdown of the banking sector into groups may be used to
enhance the quality of modelling the performance of the banking sector.
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3 Review of empirical research
In spite of the criticism towards both the theory and the methodology of iden-
tifying strategic groups (cf. Barney and Hoskisson, 1990; Cool and Dierickx,
1993; Ferguson and Ketchen, 1999; Hatten and Hatten 1987; Ketchen and
Shook, 1996), popularity of research on strategic groups resulted in multiple
empirical research aimed at identifying strategic groups in particular indus-
tries. Research was related both to manufacturing companies: beer industry
(Tremblay, 1985; Houthoofd and Heene, 2002) and pharmaceutical industry
(Cool and Dierickx, 1993), and to service providers: healthcare (Nath and
Grucka, 1997), IT (Duysters and Hagedoorn, 1995), and — in particular
— companies providing financial services: the insurance sector (Fiegenbaum
and Thomas, 1993) and the banking sector (Amel and Rhoades, 1988; Mehra,
1996).
Initially, the research on strategic groups linked the membership of a
company in a group with the relative size of the company (its market share),
what resulted directly from adoption of the structure-conduct-performance
hypothesis. Such an approach was adopted by Porter (1979) and Caves
and Pugel (1980). Newman (1978) noticed that the existence of strategic
groups may stem from the adoption of various target functions by different
companies; however, he still uses the measure of the relative size of the
company — the Herfindahl-Hirschman index — as a measure of homogeneity
of companies in a given industry.
Oster (1982) on the other hand uses the ratio of advertising expenditure
to sales revenues as a strategic variable in her research. She also proposes to
base the separation of groups on certain leading variables, i.e. predetermined
variables, which would be used in all the research related to the identification
of strategic groups. It would be difficult, however, to identify such variables
for various industries, considering the fact that, in particular industries, var-
ious balance sheet items may reflect the strategy adopted by the company.
This is especially true in the case of the banking sector, where banks’ assets
and liabilities items differ substantially from balance sheets of companies in
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other industries. Oster’s (1982) recommendation may be taken into consid-
eration only when conducting research related to a certain industry.
All the research mentioned above assumes that strategic groups exist and
are defined by a certain variable selected a priori by the researcher (Amel
and Rhoades, 1988). Hayes, Spence and Marks (1983) conducted research
aimed at determining whether strategic groups may be isolated within US
investment banks. The shortcoming of their approach is the use of a simple
analysis of correlation of the vectors of earnings, which — as Amel and
Rhoades (1988) demonstrate — does not necessarily determine the existence
of a group. Passmore’s (1985) research is free from this shortcoming. He
does not adopt a strategic variable a priori either but analyses the shares
of particular balance sheet items in the total portfolios of the 50 largest
commercial banks in the US. Passmore divides banks into two groups on
the basis of correlation between particular variables. The identified division
overlaps with the classification of banks as wholesale and retail commercial
banks.
Amel and Rhoades (1988) agree with Passmore’s concept to isolate groups
with the use of shares of particular asset items and not with the use of
variables based on financial results.
Their justification is based on the fact that the strategy adopted by a man-
ager should be better reflected in the balance sheet rather than in the profit
and loss account. Moreover, it is coherent with the theory that membership
of a company in a given group stems from its history, which is reflected in
accumulated assets (cf. Chapter 2). Amel and Rhoades (1988) also first used
a more refined method of group isolation — the cluster analysis, which allows
to define groups on the basis of more than one variable. Apart from that, the
authors check the stability of the breakdown into groups, by testing whether
the membership in particular groups does not change significantly in three
different years2. The necessity of existence of breakdowns sustainable over
2Research by Amel and Rhoades (1988) concerns also the banking sector and covers
the years 1978, 1981 and 1984.
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time is a remark of particular significance, as the definition of a strategic
group is related to a time horizon that is longer than one year. A breakdown
identified in a given year may stem from adopting short-term strategies or
be accidental (cf. Amel and Rhoades, 1988). The authors identified 6 groups
stable over time. Membership of a bank in a given group does not depend on
the size of the bank or on its location (small-large cities, particular states).
The identified groups do not overlap with a common classification of banks
as wholesale and retail commercial banks.
The concept of strategic groups was created in order to explain the sus-
tained differences in financial results of particular companies in an industry.
This is why most of empirical research is also focused on the significance of
differences in profitability between particular groups. The majority of re-
searchers have identified significant differences in financial results between
isolated groups (cf. Dess and Davis, 1984; Reger and Huff, 1993; Heene and
Houthoofd, 2002). Some of them, however, did not detect significant differ-
ences in profitability that could be explained by the membership in a group
(cf. Frazier and Howell, 1983; Cool and Schendel, 1987; Martens, 1988).
In the research of the banking sector the measures of profitability generally
exhibited significant differences between groups (Mehra, 1996; Koller, 2001).
Additionally, the research by Hackethal (2001) showed that only member-
ship in groups isolated on the basis of market variables explained differences
in profitability. On the other hand, there were no significant differences in
ROA and ROE detected between groups isolated on the basis of resource
based variables3.
None of the research conducted in order to identify strategic groups in
the banking sector was aimed to explain the earnings taking the profit-risk
interdependence into consideration. The earnings of a company operating in
3Hackethal (2001) introduced two kinds of breakdowns of 624 European commercial
banks: one was based on resource-based-view variables, e.g. share of deposits in total assets
or the ratio of deposits placed to deposits accepted on the interbank market, whereas the
other was based on market-based-view variables, e.g. average growth in assets or share of
loans in total assets. Each bank was thus classified into two groups.
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the financial sector is significantly influenced by — apart from the quality
of management — the adopted risk profile. Assuming that the risk profile
is reflected in the balance sheet structure of the bank, the breakdown into
strategic groups, performed on the basis of variables that represent ratios of
particular asset items to total assets, should take the bank’s risk profile into
account. Major differences not only in the earnings but also in the adopted
risk profile should occur between the thus isolated groups.
Amel and Rhoades (1988) set a kind of standard of research on strategic
groups in the banking sector. Most of research concerning this sector takes
into account their remark that balance sheet-based variables should be used
in identification of groups (cf. Koller, 2001; Hackethal, 2001). Similarly
to Amel and Rhoades (1988), Koller (2001), in relation to Austrian banks,
and Hackethal (2001), in relation to European banks, use non-hierarchical
clusters as a tool of banks’ breakdown into groups. The concept lying behind
breaking down banks into clusters is merging into groups on the basis of a
criterion that usually minimises differences between standardised values of
strategic variables.
Although most researchers have identified strategic groups in the re-
searched sectors, some of them question the existence of any breakdowns
within industries and claim that strategic groups stem from the use of false
detection methods or from the ad hoc choice of a strategic variable (cf.
Thomas and Venkatraman, 1988; Barney and Hoskisson, 1990).
Leask (2004) criticises research within the scope of strategic groups. He
claims that particular researchers select industry-specific variables, for which
the differences may be significant in one industry but not necessarily in an-
other. Similarly to Oster (1982), he criticises the fact that there is no stan-
dard of selection of variables that constitute strategy dimensions, which is
why they are somewhat subjective. He proposes to focus research on several
predefined strategic variables, so that it becomes comparable. Another crit-
icism concerns the lack of a unified method of breakdown into groups and
errors in the use of techniques based on cluster analysis. Leask notes that the
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majority of researchers do not use any test of cohesion of results obtained,
that would be alternative to the cluster analysis per se. Another common
error is including significantly correlated variables in analyses, which results
in multiple use of the same information.
Leask’s requirement of the same strategic variables for all the research
concerning strategic groups cannot be met in the case of the banking sector,
due to different characteristics of balance sheets of financial institutions in
comparison with those of manufacturing companies. However, in the selec-
tion of strategic variables we took into account most of the balance sheet
structure variables analysed by Amel and Rhoades (1988), Koller (2001) and
Hackethal (2001). Thus we made an effort to make our research comparable
with other research on strategic groups in the banking sector.
In spite of the criticism and the high and low tides of interest that ac-
company research on strategic groups, it seems to have achieved a certain
level of analytical standard which allows for a statement that it has become
a recognised field of research (cf. Heene and Houthoofd, 2002).
4 Data — strategy dimensions
The data analysed in this paper come from all the operating Polish com-
mercial banks, including 3 associating cooperative banks, from the period
between the first quarter of 1997 and the third quarter of 2004. The banks
that went bankrupt in this period or were under commissary administration
have also been included. The data come from banks’ reports and include the
balances sheet items as at the end of March, June, September and Decem-
ber4 or quarterly data for the profit and loss account items. The ratios that
constitute the dimensions of the strategy have been derived from yearly data.
In the case of balance sheet data, the arithmetic mean has been calculated
for particular items as at the end of each quarter. In the case of the profit
4Data on Treasury bills are an exception — their balances as at the end of every of the
12 months have been taken into account, due to the high volatility of this asset category.
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and loss account items, the ratios have been calculated based on the values
of particular items as at year-end. In the case of a bank that terminated its
operation or was taken over by another bank during the year, it has been
included in the analysis within the scope of the data from the year preceding
its liquidation or acquisition.
The measure of homogeneity (similarity) in the cluster analysis is the de-
gree of diversity between particular strategic variables in consecutive periods.
We have divided these variables into three categories:
Category I: variables defining the strategy of use of acquired
resources. They are taken into account with the purpose of defining the
market segment or the product group on which a given bank focuses its
activity. Some of the ratios characterise also major customer groups — on
the asset side:
• Total loans / total assets
• Loans to individuals / total loans
• Housing loans / loans to households
• Corporate loans / total loans
• Securities / total assets
• Foreign currency loans / foreign currency liabilities5.
Category II: variables defining the strategy of acquiring resources.
The ratios below define the way a bank acquires resources for financing assets
and its competitiveness in this area. Some of the variables characterise also
customer groups — on the liabilities side.
5In Category I three other ratios have also been taken into account: (Securities +
net debt on the interbank market) / total assets, housing loans / total loans and foreign
currency loans / total loans. However, they have been removed from the set of variables
constituting strategy dimensions due to their high coefficients of correlation (over 0.6) with
other variables.
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• Net debt on the interbank market / total assets
• Debt in foreign financial institutions / total assets
• Deposits from individuals / total assets
• Corporate deposits / total assets
• Foreign currency deposits from non-financial sector / total assets.
Category III: variables defining the strategy in the bank’s struc-
ture of costs and revenues. They are taken into account in order to
differentiate between retail and wholesale banks.
• Total assets per employed (the lower the ratio, the more retail the bank
is — more numerous customer service staff)
• Salaries / total assets
• Fee income / income from banking activity (indicates whether the bank
focuses on the traditional income on margin or is rather focused on
services)
• Personnel costs per employed6.
All the variables mentioned above have been taken into account in the
calculations jointly, as well as separate clusters have been isolated for dif-
ferent categories of variables. Thus, we have obtained results on the basis
of a multidimensional analysis, i.e. analysis of clusters in three different di-
mensions defined by variables from particular categories7, and on the basis
of a one-dimensional analysis of clusters taking into account all the variables
6In Category III three other ratios have been initially taken into account: interest
expenses from the non-financial sector / total interest expenses, (interest expenses + fee
expenses) from the non-financial sector / financial income from banking activity, operating
costs / total assets. These variables have been excluded from further analysis due to their
high correlation coefficients (over 0.6) with other variables from the set.
7Hackethal (2001) has broken down banks in two dimensions (cf. footnote 3).
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jointly. Such an approach aims, among other things, at defining which of
the categories of variables (which of the dimensions) best explains the banks’
earnings. In the analytical scheme, it will be possible to use clusters defined
in different breakdowns, depending on what the equation from the analytical
scheme is related to.
As it stems from theoretical deliberations, potential variables that are
strategy dimensions should include such values as the risk management qual-
ity, the ability to maintain the existing and win new customers, expenses for
the development of a branch network and risk management models, or adver-
tising expenditure. However, these values are difficult to measure or they are
unavailable in the banking statistics, which is why taking into account the
measures of e.g. management quality would give rise to doubts as regards
their definitions. Apart from that, we assume that expenses for the devel-
opment of a branch network or advertising expenditure should be reflected
in the variables that have been taken into account, such as total assets per
employed or deposits from individuals / total assets.
5 Adopted research method
There are many methods of building the groups. According to (Halkidi et
al., 2001) the following clustering procedures can be differentiated:
• partitional clustering — consists in partitioning the population into
a predetermined number of clusters. The number of clusters is de-
termined on the basis of a predetermined optimisation criterion (e.g.
minimisation of the loss of information),
• hierarchical clustering — by this method, groups are obtained recur-
sively as a result of agglomerating smaller clusters into larger ones, and
an adequate indicator of the cutting level (e.g. the inconsistency ratio)
is used as a criterion of stopping the procedure before obtaining only
one group,
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• density-based clustering — clusters are formed through increasing the
appropriately measured density of elements in clusters,
• grid-based clustering — groups are created as a result of dividing the
element feature space into cubes. By this very simple method, clusters
are created from single cubes that elements of the population fall into.
Cluster research does not finish with the mere constructing of the groups.
In order to justify the correctness of results it is necessary to carry out sig-
nificance tests for the groups in terms of the selected analysis criteria or the
purpose of cluster building. These can be statistical or econometric tests, or
adequate validity indices in the case of models that lack a defined probabilis-
tic structure (e.g. when clusters are fuzzy sets).
For the purpose of clustering banks Ward’s algorithm has been used,
that minimises distances between variables within a group (i.e. maximises
the group’s homogeneity). The advantage of this hierarchical method is that
it allows illustrating interdependencies between groups. The so-called den-
drograms that are created during the visualisation of the algorithm allow to
define distances between clusters and to isolate elements that are most alike
within a given group, as well as elements that fit less to the cluster, in terms of
the clustering criterion used. As Ward (1953) pointed out, the purpose of his
research was to find a breakdown of population that would minimise the loss
of information about the population, resulting from the clustering process.
In his search for optimal clustering, Ward limited himself to procedures that,
in their each step, decrease the number of groups by 1 and minimise the
loss of information. Ward’s approach (1963) was a compromise between the
simplicity of the scheme and its optimality in the broadest meaning. Ward’s
procedure comprises n subsequent steps, where n is a number of elements
(in this paper, the elements are banks) of the starting set. Ward assumed
that a structure every element of which constitutes a separate group contains
the most information about the elements of the examined set. In step zero,
one-element groups are created from all the elements of the examined popu-
lation. In every following step of the algorithm, two groups remaining from
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the previous step of the procedure are merged in a way that will minimise
the increase in the cost of information loss, i.e. — as Ward assumed — the
d2i (G,H) value, where:
d2i (G,H) = nGnH
‖x¯G − x¯H‖2
nG + nH
(1)
whereas x¯G, x¯H , nG and nH are mean values of elements from sets G and H
and their sizes, respectively, minimised after all breakdowns of GH obtained
in step i−1 into sets G and H (G∪H = GH and G∩H = ∅). In other words,
two groups are merged in a given step, where no other pair of groups with a
smaller distance between them can be found. When two groups are merged,
the procedure goes to the next step. d2i is a measure of distance; during its
calculation, the groups are identified with their ”mean” element (the average
representative) and Euclidean distance between them is measured. Only two
groups are merged in a given step, all the other ones remain unchanged.
As a result of applying the procedure mentioned above, all the elements
are clustered, i.e. the procedure does not leave any elements unclassified.
However, when analysing the hierarchy of the groups created in subsequent
steps, we can use additional criteria of stopping the algorithm. The algorithm
itself does not have any principle that would allow it to stop before creating
one group of all the elements (banks), when m groups (1 < m < n), are
created. Such a principle could consist in defining what part of the variance
should be explained, where the larger the number of groups (clusters) is, the
more variance is explained. On the one hand, the number of clusters should
not be excessively large as it makes identification of groups that remain
steady over time more difficult. A smaller number of clusters though may
cause a situation where a single cluster comprises banks of different activity
profiles and different risk profiles that affect profitability in different ways.
The problem of selecting the cutting level may be avoided with the use of
an adequate variant of the method based on a group cohesion index (e.g.
Celinski-Harabasz index, Dunn index etc., see Halkidi et al., 2001). For a
predetermined number of clusters, which are supposed to result from the use
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of a selected method of clustering, an index is calculated and the breakdown
that gives the highest value of the index, is selected. The choice of an index
usually becomes an issue of controversy.
In the initial phase of research, a cutting rule was adopted, which was
used to isolate more than 1 group. It is based on the so-called inconsistency
ratios, which measure the weight of linkages created between elements com-
prising particular groups — the ”closer” to each other two elements are in
terms of their isolated features (the more they are alike), the lower the incon-
sistency ratios bare. The number of groups proved to be sensitive to the level
of criterion adopted. Slight changes in the cutting level caused a two-fold
increase in the number of groups. Defining the distance level above which
building of subsequent groups was stopped turned out to be a better crite-
rion stopping the procedure. With regard to the comparability of results for
different clustering criteria, the stop level was defined as a percentage of the
maximum distance between groups, whose merging in the next step would
result in the whole studied population becoming one single group. In other
words, it is a percentage of the distance between groups in the case where
there is no stopping criterion and, as a result of using the algorithm, there
are only 2 groups left. The percentage of the distance was determined at
70%. The stop level therefore defines the depth, down to which the merging
of the population elements into groups takes place.
Alternatively, the balance between the number of clusters and the ex-
plained variance may be defined with the use of the so-called jack-knifing, i.e.
through defining a boundary (acceptable) percentage of unclassified banks,
e.g. at 10%, or with the use of discriminative analysis, i.e. finding a boundary
(optimal) percentage of explained variance on the basis of adopted optimi-
sation criterion (target function).
Within particular groups (clusters), the variables that differ in a statisti-
cally significant way between groups, can be determined with the use of e.g.
logit models. It allows for determining the mobility barriers, i.e. the strategic
variables — variables that make separating the groups (clusters) reasonable
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(significant). Significant differences in the values of these variables and the
lack of convergence over time may lead to formulating of a thesis defining
the factors of clustering of the banks within particular strategies (clusters).
As the research aims at a breakdown of banks into groups, which would
be further used in constructing the analytical scheme for the purposes of,
inter alia, modelling the financial result of the banking sector for the needs
of the financial stability assessment, two hypotheses have been verified:
H1 The groups created differ significantly in terms of their ROA.
H2 In the regression equations of profitability, based on selected micro- and
macroeconomic variables, the estimated model parameters are more
significant for the estimation of equations for groups of banks than for
the total sector.
As the breakdown into groups should be helpful in defining different prof-
itability levels, the return on assets — as one of the profitability measures
— has been used to test the diversity of groups8. If there were two groups
with identical distributions, the differentiation between them would be of
no use. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics has been used (cf. Gajek and
Ka luszka, 2000), which enables verification of the consistency of distributions
of the ratios of the net income from banking activity / total assets and the
pre-tax earnings / total assets between groups. This test is very sensitive to
the location of distribution, i.e. the location of the distribution around the
mean (due to the way of defining the distance of distributions as the max-
imum distance between the points of the cumulative distribution function).
It also generates relatively high Type II errors, although it has a relatively
high power for smaller samples (cf. Capon, 1965; Smirnov, 1948). The null
hypothesis for each pair of groups is the equality of profitability distributions
in the groups. The hypothesis was tested on three significance levels — 0.01,
0.05 and 0.10.
8In research relating to testing the significance of separation into groups, in order to
explain differences in profitability return on equity ratio is also used.
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Another test was carried out on the basis of linear regression models of
the average pre-tax earnings over total assets (ROA) and pre-tax earnings
over own funds (ROE) of banks, depending on the average values for a given
strategic group of the following variables, which may influence the banks’
financial results (similar variables and a series of other variables used in
panel estimation of banks’ results can be found in e.g. DeYoung and Rice,
2004):
• (dPKB) rate of change in GDP,
• (sprGOSP) spread between the interest rate on household deposits and
loans,
• (sprKWIB) spread between the interest rate on corporate loans and
the three-month WIBOR rate,
• (sprPRZ) spread between the interest rate on corporate deposits and
loans,
• (IrLOAN) percentage of irregular loans,
• (PPI) inflation index,
• (WIG) Warsaw Stock Exchange Index,
• (D-N/AKT) the ratio of the difference between banks’ receivables and
deposits in banks to assets.
Data from the period between the first quarter of 1998 and the fourth
quarter of 2004 have been used. The research is limited to comparing the
model estimates with two regressors selected among the above-mentioned
variables. For each pair of variables, three models of ROA dependence on
the average values of variables in the whole population of analysed banks and
on means in the group of banks which in 2004 were classified into 2 selected
groups have been estimated. For simplicity purposes it is assumed that the
breakdown of banks into groups has not changed over time and remains the
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same as in 2004. This is a strong assumption, although a sufficient one for
comparison purposes. Better estimates of models for series of mean values
of variables in the obtained groups than for the mean calculated for all the
banks would suggest that the financial results of the banking sector should
be modelled with the use of a breakdown into groups of similar banks.
In the case of researching strategic groups for multiple periods, a question
arises about the sustainability of results over time. In the verification of the
sustainability, the percentage of banks migrating between groups has been
used.
6 Results
In order to identify the strategic groups, we have made calculations for all the
variables jointly (a one-dimensional analysis) and taking into account only
variables from particular categories described in chapter 4 (a multidimen-
sional analysis). In the one-dimensional analysis, each bank is assigned to
one cluster, whereas in the multidimensional analysis — to three clusters. In
the multidimensional analysis banks are clustered in three dimensions, con-
sidering the strategy relating to assets, liabilities and the income and expense
structure.
Figures 1-4 include an exemplary dendrograms for the one-dimensional
analysis, whereas figures 5-6 include exemplary results of the multidimen-
sional analysis.
The number of clusters (colours) in a given dendrogram is determined by
the adopted cutting level. At a lower cutting level, the number of groups
increases and its homogeneity rises. When the cutting level is moved to its
lowest value, each bank will constitute a separate cluster.
The Celinski-Harabasz index, calculated for the 2004 data, proves that
the adopted cutting level adequately characterised the number of groups and
the composition of strategic groups, cf. Figure 7. Although lowering the
cutting level to a level that would isolate 9 groups gives a higher value of
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the index, the number of groups is then very sensitive to moving the cutting
level.
The Celinski-Harabasz index for groups in 2003 expressly indicates 5 clus-
ters, cf. Figure 8. However, the breakdown is again very sensitive to the
cutting level. For example, lowering the cutting that gives 5 groups by 10%
would result in obtaining 7 groups, and lowering it by 20% would give 8
groups.
Tables on figures 5-6 include an analysis of stability over time of clusters
identified in the one-dimensional analysis, i.e. an attempt to identify strategic
groups in the Polish banking sector. Banks are sorted on the basis of their
assignment to clusters in 2004. Particular numbers of clusters have been
replaced with names originating from the profiles of the banks that are the
most numerous in a given cluster. No names have been given to the clusters
for which defining a dominant profile is impossible. In this case, symbol ,,∗”
in cells of tables 5 and 6 denotes banks that are not classified to any of the
considered groups. An empty space in the table means the bank was not
active in the relevant period. In general, it refers to clusters of no more than
4 banks classified.
On tables on figure 9 we present, for three significance levels, percentages
of rejected null hypotheses of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on the lack of
a significant difference between the distributions of the pre-tax earnings /
total assets or net income from banking activity / total assets ratios among
the banks assigned to particular clusters. The percentages are presented for
clusters identified for particular categories (the multidimensional analysis) as
well as for all the categories jointly (the one-dimensional analysis) in partic-
ular years. The aim of this breakdown is to help identify the categories and
years which show significant differences in distributions of pre-tax earnings
or net income from banking activity, recorded in particular clusters.
Tables 1-6 present estimates of regression equations that serve to assess
the significance of the breakdown into groups by the method of modelling the
profitability of banks, which are gathered in tables 1-6. Tables 1-3 include
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estimates of regression of ROA for arithmetic means of regressor levels in the
two most numerous groups of banks and for means in the whole population.
Tables 4-6 present the results of estimations of models explaining the
average ROE of banks in groups corresponding to those in the case of ROA.
The calculated significance levels of the t-Student statistics that correspond
to the statistically significant variables at the level of 5% have been indicated
with a bold red font. The penultimate column comprises the F statistic
used to test the hypothesis that all parameters of the model, except for the
constant term, are equal to 0. The last column comprises results of the
Jarque-Bera test. The red font indicates the significance levels at which
the null hypothesis of normality of the distribution of residuals cannot be
rejected.
7 Conclusions
The analysis of dendrograms and the analysis of sustainability of clusters over
time allows for a statement that groups that are sustainable over time started
isolating in 2000, which may be related to significant changes in ownership
in the years 1998-1999.
The one-dimensional analysis allowed for isolating of the following groups
of banks, the names of which have been determined on the basis of the
dominant profiles in particular clusters9: universal banks, corporate banks,
car finance and mortgage banks, retail banks, regional banks. The group
of car finance and mortgage banks remains stable throughout the period,
whereas in 2003 it was divided into two groups: (1) mortgage banks and (2)
car finance banks. In the years 1997-2001 there was a stable group of regional
banks. There were migrations of some banks between groups, particularly
before 2000, but there are also banks that have not changed their group
9As the breakdown of banks was considerably different in 1997 and it was impossible
to determine dominant profiles of clusters, the largest cluster in this period was called
retail-universal-car finance.
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membership over the whole period. In the years 2000-2004 the percentage of
banks that did not migrate amounted in particular groups to: 63.6% in the
group of car finance and mortgage banks10, 58.3% in the group of retail banks,
57.9% in the group of universal banks and 33.3% in the group of corporate
banks. Corporate banks form the least stable group over time. Banks that
migrated in those years between groups were most often members of two
various groups. Only two banks belonged to three various groups within
that period.
Weights of groups in terms of the share of assets of banks of particu-
lar clusters in the total value of assets of commercial banks vary a lot. In
2004 universal banks dominated with a 61.4% share in assets. Retail banks
and corporate banks also had major shares (20.1% and 13.3%, respectively).
Clusters of car finance and mortgage banks (3.6%) and housing banks (1.0%)
were small in terms of the size of assets.
Membership of banks in groups identified in 2000-2004 overlaps to a large
extent with the classification of the General Inspectorate of Banking Super-
vision (GINB)11. Of 10 banks classified as mortgage banks or car finance
banks, 8 have been included in the group of car finance-mortgage banks. Of
11 banks classified by GINB as retail banks, 8 have been included in the
group of retail banks. The worst convergence was obtained for corporate
banks — 10 out of 16 banks. Of 10 banks classified by GINB as universal
banks, 9 were assigned to the group of universal banks.
It stems from Figure 9 that significantly higher percentages of rejected
null hypotheses of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test exist only for variables of
Category I (from the multidimensional analysis) and for all the variables
jointly (one-dimensional analysis). These results are consistent with Hack-
ethal’s research (Hackethal, 2001), who identified differences in profitability
between groups of European banks, but only on the basis of the breakdown
into groups with the use of market based values (cf. Chapter 3). Percentages
10The breakdown of this group into two subgroups in 2003 was ignored in the calculation
of this percentage.
11”Composition of groups of commercial banks for 2005”, GINB, April 2005, mimeo
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are higher only for the years 2000-2004, in particular for the income from
banking activity. No major differences have been observed in the distribu-
tions of profitability ratios: pre-tax earnings / total assets and net income
from banking activity / total assets for other dimensions (for variables of
Categories II and III). It means that membership of a bank in a given group
may be meaningful for the explanation of differences in profitability after the
year 2000, but only for groups identified on the basis of all variables jointly
or on the basis of variables of Category I. In terms of the net income from
banking activity, the percentage of rejected test hypotheses is higher also for
the years 1997-1999; however, the existence of strategic groups that would be
meaningful for the explanation of differences in profitability in those years,
has no confirmation in the case of pre-tax earnings / total assets distribu-
tion. Therefore, we have obtained a confirmation of the hypothesis that the
strategy adopted by a bank leads to differences in results, but only for the
second half of the analysed period. The results of this analysis show that
strategic groups in the Polish banking sector can be identified after the year
2000.
Estimation of regression equations of profitability has been carried out for
mean values of ratios in 2 groups, called the universal group and the retail
group (cf. Chapter 6). These are the most numerous groups identified on
the basis of the 2004 data. The groups include 23 universal banks and 12
retail banks. Among the 28 models with ROA as the explanatory variable
that have been estimated for the two groups, there are models with good
basic statistical properties. In the case of the universal group, statistically
significant coefficients different from 0 for at least one variable of the model
have been obtained for 7 equations, and in the case of the retail group —
for 4 equations. However, for means from the whole examined population of
banks (cf. Table 3) no equation proved to be significant at the level of 5%.
Estimation statistics support the concept that description and forecasting
of profitability should be analysed with banks broken down into groups of
similar banks that make e.g. the strategic groups proposed by the authors
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of this paper. A ROE analysis does not confirm as clearly as ROA regres-
sion estimators that examination of profitability within strategic groups leads
to smaller estimation errors. Out of 28 equations (cf. Tables 4 and 5) for
the group of universal banks, 9 equations have significant coefficients, but
none of the models estimated on the basis of corporate banks data proved
to be statistically correct. Some equations describing ROE with parameters
calculated on the basis of data for all the banks jointly have better proper-
ties, although an equation with all its coefficients significant has not been
obtained.
It stems from the analysis carried out with the use of the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test and the regression equations that a breakdown of banks into
strategic groups allows for a more precise modelling of profitability of the
banking sector. It creates a possibility of better forecasting of the banking
sector earnings, which is of vital importance for analyses of the financial
system stability. Therefore, results of analysis of the breakdown of banks
into strategic groups may be used in further works on the analytical scheme.
Making use of the theory of strategic groups in identification of the structure
of the banking sector facilitates a more precise ex ante assessment of stability
of the financial system.
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Annex
The cutting level for dendrograms presented in Annex 1 is at 70% of the
maximum distance between groups.
The following symbols denoting groups of banks have been applied:
• (S\H) — car finance and mortgage banks,
• (K) — corporate banks,
• (D) — retail banks,
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• (U) — universal banks.
The symbols relate to the classification made on the basis of all the ratios
(the one-dimensional analysis) in 2004. Such a breakdown is also applied
in this Annex, i.e. in relation to clusters identified on the basis of variables
from 1st, 2nd and 3rd category (multidimensional analysis).
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Figure 1: Clusters of banks as at the end of 2004
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Figure 2: Clusters of banks as at the end of 2004, built on the basis of
asset-related ratios
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Figure 3: Clusters of banks as at the end of 2004, built on the basis of
liabilities-related ratios
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Figure 4: Clusters of banks as at the end of 2004, built on the basis of ratios
from profit and loss account
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Figure 5: Clusters of banks — cumulative table
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Figure 6: Clusters of banks — cumulative table
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Figure 7: Level of the Celinski-Harabasz index for groups on the basis of the 2004
data
Banks that, at the cutting level of 70% of the maximum distance between groups,
created clusters of one or two elements, have been removed from the set of analysed
banks. There are 4 banks removed in this way. As a result, an index for clusters
potentially significant for the examination of profitability has been obtained.
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Figure 8: Level of the Celinski-Harabasz index for groups on the basis of the 2003
data
Banks that, at the cutting level of 70% of the maximum distance between groups,
created clusters of one or two elements have been removed from the set of analysed
banks. There are 3 banks removed in this way. As a result an index for clusters
potentially significant for the examination of profitability has been obtained.
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Figure 9: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for distributions of ROA measures in the
groups of banks
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NR a0 dPKB sprGOSP sprKWIB sprPRZ IrLOAN PPI WIG D-N/AKT R2 F p (JB)
1) 0 0.16 0 – – – – – – 0.17 2.55 (0.37)
(0.73) (0.11) (0.97)
2) -0.01 0.24 – 0 – – – – – 0.31 5.41 (0.34)
(0.7) (0) (0.03)
3) -0.03 0.24 – – 0 – – – – 0.63 20.5 (0.79)
(0) (0) (0)
4) 0.03 0.03 – – – -0.11 – – – 0.75 37.31 (0.54)
(0) (0.41) (0)
5) -0.21 -0.08 – – – – 0 – – 0.39 7.78 (0.5)
(0) (0.46) (0)
6) 0.02 0.34 – – – – – -0.01 – 0.46 10.23 (0.41)
(0) (0) (0)
7) -0.03 0.26 – – – – – – 0.1 0.39 7.72 (0.63)
(0.04) (0) (0)
8) 0.04 – -0.01 0 – – – – – 0.22 3.43 (0.36)
(0) (0.01) (0.04)
9) 0.01 – -0.01 – 0 – – – – 0.52 13.33 (0.3)
(0.05) (0) (0)
10) 0.02 – 0 – – -0.11 – – – 0.75 36.48 (0.32)
(0) (0.6) (0)
11) -0.29 – 0 – – – 0 – – 0.46 10.23 (0.08)
(0) (0.07) (0)
12) 0.07 – -0.01 – – – – -0.01 – 0.25 4.13 (0.65)
(0) (0.01) (0.02)
13) 0.02 – -0.01 – – – – – 0.07 0.2 3.16 (0.3)
(0.05) (0.03) (0.06)
14) -0.01 – – -0.01 0 – – – – 0.28 4.8 (0.56)
(0.24) (0.54) (0)
15) 0.03 – – 0 – -0.11 – – – 0.76 39.22 (0.15)
(0) (0.21) (0)
16) -0.22 – – 0 – – 0 – – 0.54 14.27 (0.26)
(0) (0) (0)
17) 0.01 – – 0 – – – -0.01 – 0.02 0.24 (0.32)
(0.26) (0.76) (0.77)
18) 0 – – 0 – – – – 0.03 0.03 0.49 (0.22)
(0.65) (0.93) (0.45)
19) 0.02 – – – 0 -0.1 – – – 0.77 41.34 (0.69)
(0) (0.11) (0)
20) -0.19 – – – 0 – 0 – – 0.65 22.62 (0.53)
(0) (0) (0)
21) -0.02 – – – 0 – – 0 – 0.29 4.92 (0.56)
(0.22) (0) (0.46)
22) -0.01 – – – 0 – – – -0.1 0.36 7 (0.95)
(0.83) (0) (0.07)
23) 0.01 – – – – -0.11 0 – – 0.75 36.14 (0.46)
(0.65) (0) (0.74)
24) 0.03 – – – – -0.11 – -0.01 – 0.78 42.68 (0.03)
(0) (0) (0.07)
25) 0.02 – – – – -0.11 – – 0.02 0.76 38.98 (0.68)
(0) (0) (0.22)
26) -0.23 – – – – – 0 -0.01 – 0.64 21.53 (0.32)
(0) (0) (0)
27) -0.22 – – – – – 0 – 0.08 0.54 14.16 (0.39)
(0) (0) (0)
28) 0 – – – – – – -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.49 (0.23)
(0.75) (0.92) (0.45)
Table 1: Estimation for the group of universal banks (2004)
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NR a0 dPKB sprGOSP sprKWIB sprPRZ IrLOAN PPI WIG D-N/AKT R2 F p (JB)
1) -0.01 0.22 -0.01 – – – – – – 0.04 0.57 (0)
(0.95) (0.52) (0.86)
2) -0.05 0.48 – 0 – – – – – 0.15 2.18 (0.01)
(0.02) (0.08) (0.09)
3) -0.13 0.54 – – 0.01 – – – – 0.55 14.77 (0.26)
(0) (0) (0)
4) 0.04 -0.06 – – – -0.24 – – – 0.61 19.29 (0.31)
(0) (0.76) (0)
5) -0.66 -0.48 – – – – 0 – – 0.24 3.88 (0.01)
(0.01) (0.2) (0.01)
6) -0.01 0.37 – – – – – -0.01 – 0.05 0.69 (0)
(0.89) (0.26) (0.61)
7) -0.15 0.61 – – – – – – 0.15 0.08 1.11 (0.05)
(0.25) (0.15) (0.31)
8) 0.06 – -0.01 0.01 – – – – – 0.16 2.4 (0.04)
(0.14) (0.06) (0.05)
9) -0.02 – -0.01 – 0.01 – – – – 0.55 15.16 (0.58)
(0.64) (0) (0)
10) 0.03 – -0.01 – – -0.24 – – – 0.61 19.17 (0.31)
(0.15) (0.97) (0)
11) -0.75 – 0 – – – 0 – – 0.25 4.11 (0.01)
(0.01) (0.16) (0.01)
12) 0.05 – -0.01 – – – – -0.01 – 0.03 0.41 (0)
(0.52) (0.39) (0.74)
13) 0.01 – -0.01 – – – – – 0.02 0.03 0.38 (0.01)
(0.81) (0.4) (0.8)
14) -0.09 – – -0.01 0.01 – – – – 0.39 7.72 (0.3)
(0) (0.61) (0)
15) 0.03 – – 0 – -0.24 – – – 0.61 19.28 (0.3)
(0) (0.78) (0)
16) -0.58 – – 0 – – 0 – – 0.35 6.5 (0.06)
(0) (0.02) (0)
17) -0.07 – – 0 – – – 0 – 0.09 1.26 (0.03)
(0.12) (0.13) (0.22)
18) 0.01 – – 0 – – – – -0.04 0.04 0.55 (0)
(0.86) (0.31) (0.68)
19) -0.01 – – – 0 -0.19 – – – 0.66 23.41 (0.78)
(0.89) (0.08) (0)
20) -0.48 – – – 0.01 – 0 – – 0.57 16.34 (0.51)
(0) (0) (0)
21) -0.17 – – – 0.01 – – 0 – 0.53 14.04 (0.46)
(0) (0) (0)
22) -0.01 – – – 0.01 – – – -0.13 0.44 9.7 (0.35)
(0.86) (0) (0.11)
23) 0.09 – – – – -0.25 -0.01 – – 0.61 19.34 (0.3)
(0.54) (0) (0.72)
24) 0.01 – – – – -0.25 – 0 – 0.64 21.86 (0.49)
(0.23) (0) (0.16)
25) -0.05 – – – – -0.26 – – 0.11 0.67 24.63 (0.68)
(0.3) (0) (0.05)
26) -0.48 – – – – – 0 -0.01 – 0.22 3.52 (0)
(0.01) (0.01) (0.3)
27) -0.91 – – – – – 0 – 0.24 0.32 5.84 (0.28)
(0) (0) (0.03)
28) -0.01 – – – – – – 0 -0.02 0 0.05 (0)
(0.98) (0.82) (0.89)
Table 2: Estimation of the regression model of ROA for the group of retail
banks (2004)
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NR a0 dPKB sprGOSP sprKWIB sprPRZ IrLOAN PPI WIG D-N/AKT R2 F p (JB)
1) -0.02 0 0 – – – – – – 0.02 0.31 (0)
(0.77) (0.99) (0.56)
2) 0.01 -0.12 – 0 – – – – – 0.01 0.15 (0)
(0.36) (0.67) (0.91)
3) 0.02 -0.14 – – -0.01 – – – – 0.01 0.16 (0)
(0.43) (0.57) (0.84)
4) -0.01 -0.04 – – – 0.08 – – – 0.02 0.36 (0)
(0.97) (0.9) (0.51)
5) 0.03 -0.11 – – – – -0.01 – – 0.01 0.14 (0)
(0.9) (0.78) (0.95)
6) 0.04 0.08 – – – – – -0.01 – 0.05 0.73 (0)
(0.09) (0.77) (0.28)
7) 0.01 -0.12 – – – – – – 0.01 0.01 0.18 (0)
(0.33) (0.62) (0.77)
8) -0.02 – 0 -0.01 – – – – – 0.02 0.32 (0)
(0.63) (0.47) (0.87)
9) -0.02 – 0 – -0.01 – – – – 0.03 0.37 (0)
(0.73) (0.39) (0.74)
10) -0.02 – 0 – – 0.06 – – – 0.03 0.44 (0)
(0.65) (0.67) (0.61)
11) -0.08 – 0 – – – 0 – – 0.02 0.33 (0)
(0.79) (0.5) (0.83)
12) 0.03 – 0 – – – – -0.01 – 0.05 0.69 (0)
(0.62) (0.96) (0.39)
13) -0.02 – 0 – – – – – 0.01 0.02 0.35 (0)
(0.62) (0.45) (0.78)
14) 0.01 – – 0 -0.01 – – – – 0 0.08 (0)
(0.56) (0.69) (0.84)
15) -0.01 – – 0 – 0.08 – – – 0.03 0.39 (0)
(0.79) (0.77) (0.41)
16) 0.07 – – 0 – – -0.01 – – 0.01 0.12 (0)
(0.68) (0.85) (0.72)
17) 0.05 – – -0.01 – – – -0.01 – 0.06 0.83 (0)
(0.15) (0.61) (0.22)
18) 0 – – 0 – – – – 0.01 0 0.08 (0)
(0.5) (0.82) (0.82)
19) -0.01 – – – 0 0.09 – – – 0.03 0.37 (0)
(0.79) (0.83) (0.39)
20) 0.08 – – – -0.01 – -0.01 – – 0 0.1 (0)
(0.59) (0.97) (0.64)
21) 0.06 – – – -0.01 – – -0.01 – 0.07 0.91 (0)
(0.15) (0.51) (0.18)
22) 0.02 – – – -0.01 – – – 0.05 0.01 0.16 (0)
(0.44) (0.64) (0.56)
23) -0.09 – – – – 0.12 0 – – 0.03 0.39 (0)
(0.76) (0.45) (0.77)
24) 0.02 – – – – 0.06 – -0.01 – 0.07 0.91 (0)
(0.48) (0.52) (0.3)
25) -0.03 – – – – 0.16 – – 0.07 0.07 0.92 (0)
(0.35) (0.2) (0.3)
26) 0.01 – – – – – 0 -0.01 – 0.05 0.7 (0)
(0.94) (0.88) (0.28)
27) 0.09 – – – – – -0.01 – 0.02 0.01 0.2 (0)
(0.55) (0.59) (0.66)
28) 0.04 – – – – – – -0.01 -0.03 0.06 0.76 (0)
(0.17) (0.24) (0.7)
Table 3: Estimation of regression model of ROA for all the banks (2004)
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NR a0 dPKB sprGOSP sprKWIB sprPRZ IrLOAN PPI WIG D-N/AKT R2 F p (JB)
1) -0.01 2.05 0 – – – – – – 0.16 2.28 (0.45)
(0.99) (0.1) (0.83)
2) -0.08 2.94 – 0.03 – – – – – 0.33 6.16 (0.4)
(0.2) (0) (0.01)
3) -0.34 2.89 – – 0.06 – – – – 0.65 23.16 (0.65)
(0) (0) (0)
4) 0.32 0.36 – – – -1.18 – – – 0.71 29.94 (0.53)
(0) (0.51) (0)
5) -2.01 -0.53 – – – – 0.02 – – 0.3 5.35 (0.38)
(0.03) (0.69) (0.03)
6) 0.25 3.76 – – – – – -0.01 – 0.37 7.07 (0.21)
(0) (0) (0)
7) -0.34 3.33 – – – – – – 1.47 0.45 10.02 (0.75)
(0) (0) (0)
8) 0.45 – -0.05 0.04 – – – – – 0.23 3.75 (0.7)
(0) (0.01) (0.02)
9) 0.15 – -0.05 – 0.06 – – – – 0.53 14.05 (0.21)
(0.18) (0) (0)
10) 0.27 – 0 – – -1.28 – – – 0.71 30.28 (0.17)
(0) (0.43) (0)
11) -3.11 – 0.03 – – – 0.02 – – 0.37 7.24 (0.11)
(0) (0.1) (0)
12) 0.71 – -0.05 – – – – -0.01 – 0.16 2.43 (0.97)
(0.01) (0.04) (0.08)
13) 0.21 – -0.04 – – – – – 1.11 0.24 3.83 (0.33)
(0.15) (0.03) (0.02)
14) -0.16 – – -0.01 0.05 – – – – 0.31 5.59 (0.5)
(0.07) (0.73) (0)
15) 0.3 – – 0.01 – -1.22 – – – 0.74 34.84 (0.03)
(0) (0.08) (0)
16) -2.45 – – 0.03 – – 0.02 – – 0.49 11.99 (0.32)
(0) (0) (0)
17) 0.04 – – 0.01 – – – 0 – 0.03 0.47 (0.66)
(0.74) (0.39) (0.82)
18) -0.03 – – 0 – – – – 0.59 0.07 1.01 (0.38)
(0.8) (0.86) (0.3)
19) 0.2 – – – 0.02 -1.07 – – – 0.75 36.76 (0.27)
(0.01) (0.04) (0)
20) -2 – – – 0.05 – 0.01 – – 0.61 19.43 (0.43)
(0) (0) (0)
21) -0.3 – – – 0.05 – – 0 – 0.35 6.53 (0.58)
(0.05) (0) (0.24)
22) -0.1 – – – 0.07 – – – -0.83 0.36 6.94 (0.81)
(0.29) (0) (0.17)
23) 0.49 – – – – -1.27 -0.01 – – 0.7 29.34 (0.13)
(0.35) (0) (0.77)
24) 0.4 – – – – -1.24 – -0.01 – 0.72 31.87 (0.08)
(0) (0) (0.22)
25) 0.22 – – – – -1.2 – – 0.48 0.75 36.12 (0.3)
(0) (0) (0.05)
26) -2.35 – – – – – 0.02 -0.01 – 0.48 11.33 (0.17)
(0) (0) (0)
27) -2.48 – – – – – 0.02 – 1.14 0.52 13.03 (0.43)
(0) (0) (0)
28) -0.11 – – – – – – 0 0.79 0.08 1.1 (0.31)
(0.59) (0.66) (0.16)
Table 4: Estimation of regression model of ROE for the group of universal
banks (2004)
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NR a0 dPKB sprGOSP sprKWIB sprPRZ IrLOAN PPI WIG D-N/AKT R2 F p (JB)
1) -12.84 60.97 1.06 – – – – – – 0.13 1.81 (0)
(0.06) (0.09) (0.08)
2) -3.01 34.12 – 0.6 – – – – – 0.06 0.9 (0)
(0.13) (0.26) (0.25)
3) -0.36 15.87 – – -0.14 – – – – 0.02 0.24 (0)
(0.91) (0.58) (0.81)
4) -1.63 20.74 – – – 2.13 – – – 0.02 0.26 (0)
(0.4) (0.47) (0.75)
5) 34.94 60.07 – – – – -0.36 – – 0.07 0.97 (0)
(0.24) (0.18) (0.23)
6) 0.65 34.25 – – – – – -0.01 – 0.03 0.46 (0)
(0.81) (0.34) (0.48)
7) -0.03 14.85 – – – – – – -1.38 0.01 0.22 (0)
(0.99) (0.74) (0.93)
8) -3.23 – 0.24 0.17 – – – – – 0.02 0.32 (0)
(0.51) (0.67) (0.76)
9) -2.91 – 0.47 – -0.41 – – – – 0.04 0.57 (0)
(0.53) (0.33) (0.46)
10) -3.82 – 0.35 – – -0.42 – – – 0.02 0.28 (0)
(0.4) (0.45) (0.94)
11) -24.34 – 0.67 – – – 0.16 – – 0.03 0.46 (0)
(0.49) (0.35) (0.55)
12) -7.72 – 0.56 – – – – 0 – 0.03 0.43 (0)
(0.37) (0.36) (0.59)
13) 2.71 – 0.69 – – – – – -13.71 0.07 1.02 (0)
(0.69) (0.2) (0.24)
14) 0.82 – – 0.5 -0.46 – – – – 0.04 0.57 (0)
(0.76) (0.33) (0.42)
15) -1.56 – – 0.34 – 1.56 – – – 0.02 0.26 (0)
(0.41) (0.47) (0.81)
16) -3.08 – – 0.34 – – 0.01 – – 0.01 0.24 (0)
(0.88) (0.51) (0.93)
17) -3.07 – – 0.5 – – – 0 – 0.02 0.34 (0)
(0.48) (0.41) (0.65)
18) 3.73 – – 0.38 – – – – -7.06 0.03 0.49 (0)
(0.6) (0.42) (0.48)
19) 1.24 – – – -0.29 -1.34 – – – 0 0.1 (0)
(0.77) (0.66) (0.86)
20) 4.33 – – – -0.22 – -0.04 – – 0 0.1 (0)
(0.82) (0.67) (0.85)
21) 2.06 – – – -0.31 – – -0.01 – 0.01 0.14 (0)
(0.69) (0.6) (0.74)
22) 3.78 – – – -0.15 – – – -4.92 0.01 0.2 (0)
(0.6) (0.79) (0.64)
23) 3.56 – – – – -0.2 -0.04 – – 0 0.01 (0)
(0.88) (0.98) (0.87)
24) -0.36 – – – – 0.71 – -0.01 – 0 0.01 (0)
(0.89) (0.91) (0.91)
25) 4.05 – – – – 2.15 – – -6.92 0.01 0.21 (0)
(0.58) (0.75) (0.51)
26) 3.22 – – – – – -0.04 0 – 0 0.01 (0)
(0.88) (0.86) (0.99)
27) 32.66 – – – – – -0.22 – -14.14 0.04 0.54 (0)
(0.35) (0.39) (0.31)
28) 5.59 – – – – – – -0.01 -7.17 0.01 0.22 (0)
(0.54) (0.73) (0.51)
Table 5: Estimation of the regression model of ROE for the group of retail
banks (2004)
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NR a0 dPKB sprGOSP sprKWIB sprPRZ IrLOAN PPI WIG D-N/AKT R2 F p (JB)
1) -1.16 16.41 0.05 – – – – – – 0.09 1.22 (0)
(0.63) (0.2) (0.8)
2) -0.02 9.55 – -0.18 – – – – – 0.12 1.7 (0)
(0.97) (0.35) (0.34)
3) -0.71 14.57 – – 0.02 – – – – 0.09 1.19 (0)
(0.54) (0.14) (0.89)
4) 1.26 4.98 – – – -8.16 – – – 0.19 2.89 (0)
(0.25) (0.62) (0.09)
5) -4.48 9.61 – – – – 0.03 – – 0.09 1.26 (0)
(0.66) (0.53) (0.7)
6) -0.11 18.37 – – – – – -0.01 – 0.1 1.33 (0)
(0.91) (0.14) (0.6)
7) -1.01 15.39 – – – – – – 2.55 0.13 1.8 (0)
(0.08) (0.1) (0.3)
8) 0.36 – 0.01 -0.26 – – – – – 0.09 1.22 (0)
(0.82) (0.94) (0.2)
9) 1.26 – -0.14 – -0.01 – – – – 0.02 0.36 (0)
(0.44) (0.43) (0.99)
10) 1.27 – 0.05 – – -10.06 – – – 0.18 2.8 (0)
(0.38) (0.76) (0.03)
11) -13.07 – 0.08 – – – 0.11 – – 0.08 1.11 (0)
(0.28) (0.72) (0.23)
12) 1.14 – -0.14 – – – – 0 – 0.02 0.36 (0)
(0.7) (0.54) (0.96)
13) 1.03 – -0.16 – – – – – 2.27 0.06 0.78 (0)
(0.51) (0.35) (0.37)
14) 0.14 – – -0.29 0.07 – – – – 0.09 1.3 (0)
(0.87) (0.12) (0.69)
15) 2.06 – – -0.23 – -8.9 – – – 0.26 4.23 (0)
(0.01) (0.13) (0.02)
16) -6.15 – – -0.19 – – 0.06 – – 0.12 1.69 (0)
(0.39) (0.28) (0.36)
17) 1.17 – – -0.32 – – – -0.01 – 0.1 1.35 (0)
(0.42) (0.14) (0.62)
18) 0.05 – – -0.37 – – – – 4.3 0.19 2.82 (0)
(0.9) (0.03) (0.1)
19) 2.78 – – – -0.18 -10.47 – – – 0.22 3.4 (0)
(0.04) (0.31) (0.01)
20) -9.27 – – – -0.06 – 0.09 – – 0.08 1.1 (0)
(0.17) (0.75) (0.15)
21) -0.54 – – – -0.01 – – 0 – 0.01 0.17 (0)
(0.76) (0.97) (0.61)
22) 1.09 – – – -0.42 – – – 6.43 0.11 1.5 (0)
(0.31) (0.14) (0.1)
23) 6.25 – – – – -11.44 -0.05 – – 0.19 2.86 (0)
(0.56) (0.08) (0.66)
24) 1.45 – – – – -9.18 – 0 – 0.18 2.76 (0)
(0.24) (0.03) (0.84)
25) 2.21 – – – – -10.98 – – -1.65 0.19 2.95 (0)
(0.08) (0.03) (0.56)
26) -9.97 – – – – – 0.09 -0.01 – 0.08 1.05 (0)
(0.17) (0.19) (0.88)
27) -9.09 – – – – – 0.08 – 1.43 0.09 1.22 (0)
(0.17) (0.19) (0.56)
28) -2.13 – – – – – – 0 4.27 0.09 1.22 (0)
(0.13) (0.19) (0.16)
Table 6: Estimation of the regression model of ROE for all the banks (2004)
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